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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
William Locke appeals from his conviction for felony DUI. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
The state charged Locke with one felony count of DUI and a misdemeanor 
count of driving without a valid driver's license for conduct occurring on March 
20, 2008. (R., pp. 45-46.) The basis for enhancing the DUI to a felony was that 
Locke had been convicted of two other DUls within the previous ten years. (R., 
p. 46.) Locke filed a Motion to Dismiss the felony DUI alleging that "there were 
not at least two (2) violations of the provisions of Section 18-8004(l)(a)(b) or (c), 
ldaho Code within the previous ten (10) years of the alleged pending offense as 
required under ldaho Code rj 18-8005(5)." (R., pp. 49-55 (emphasis original).) 
The State filed an objection to the Motion to Dismiss. (R., pp. 56-64.) After a 
hearing, the district court found that: 
[On] July 1, 2008, the defendant pled guilty to a violation of the DUI 
statute. On October 9, 2008, the defendant pled guilty to another 
violation of the DUI statute. On October 23, 2008, the state 
amended its complaint with respect to the March 20, 2008 ticket 
where it was originally charged with just regular misdemeanor DUI 
to the felony. 
(Tr., p. 12, L. 18 - p. 13, L.1.) The parties agreed that the July 1, 2008 conviction 
was for a DUI offense which occurred on October 19, 2007 and that the October 
9, 2008 conviction was for a DUI offense which occurred on June 26, 2008. (R., 
pp. 66-67.) This made the current violation "second in time" of occurrence. (Tr., 
p. 12, Ls. 13-15.) The district court denied Locke's motion to'dismiss the felony 
enhancement stating that: 
The question presented [by Locke] is whether or not the word 
"previous" as it appears in the statute refers to previous convictions 
or to previous violations. A literal reading of the statute plainly 
demonstrates that the word previous or previously refers to 
previous pleas of guilty or findings of guilt; that is, convictions 
previous to the fhird conviction. 
(R., pp. 67-68 (emphasis original).) Locke entered a conditional guilty plea to the 
felony DUI on April 7, 2009 and count II was dismissed pursuant to plea 
negotiations. (R., p. 82.) At the change of plea hearing, Locke preserved his 
right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. (Tr., p. 24, Ls. 18-25.) The 
district court sentenced Locke to ten years with two fixed for felony DUI, and 
placed Locke on probation. (R., pp. 82-87.) Locke timely appealed from the 
judgment. (R., pp. 88-89.) 
ISSUE 
Locke states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Locke's motion to 
dismiss because his second DUI should not have been enhanced 
because it is factually impossible to have two prior DUI convictions 
prior to the second DUI offense being committed? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Locke failed to establish that the district court erred in denying 
Locke's motion to dismiss as his current DUI was properly enhanced to a felony 
under the plain language of I.C. 5 18-8005(5)? 
ARGUMENT 
Locke Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Motion To Dismiss Because His Current DUI Was Properly A Felony Under The 
Plain Lanauase Of ldaho Code Fi 18-8005(51 
A. Introduction 
Locke was convicted of felony DUI under I.C. 3 18-8005(5)', which 
enhances a DUI conviction to a felony if there are two other DUI convictions 
within the previous ten years. Locke appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss 
the felony enhancement and alleges that I.C. 9 18-8005(5) should be interpreted 
so that this DUI is not a felony. Specifically, Locke argues that the statute 
requires two DUI convictions prior to the date the instant offense occurred before 
it can be enhanced to a felony. (Appellant's brief, pp. 4-9.) However, under the 
plain language of the statute the current case was properly enhanced to a felony. 
The statute makes a third DUI conviction within ten years a felony. The statute 
does not require the acts underlying the convictions to occur in a specific 
sequence of events for purposes of the enhancement. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Questions of statutory interpretation are given free review. State v. 
Gibson, 126 ldaho 256, 256-57, 881 P.2d 551, 551-52 (Ct. App. 1994). 
' I.C. § 18-8005(5) has since been re-designated as I.C. 3 18-8005(6). 2009 
ldaho Session Laws 597 (codified as amended at I.C. $j 18-8005). All references 
to I.C. § 18-8005(5) are to the statute in effect in 2008. 
C. Locke's Current DUI Was Properly Enhanced To A Felony According To 
The Plain Lanquaae Of I.C. 6 18-8005(5) 
The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of a 
statute. State v. Schwartz, 139 ldaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). Those 
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the statute 
must be construed as a whole. @. Where the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, the court must give effect to the statute as written, without 
engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 ldaho 459, 462, 988 
P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. McCoy, 128 ldaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581 
(1996). The court assumes that the legislature meant what is clearly stated in 
the statute, unless the result is "palpably absurd." Schwartz, 139 ldaho at 362, 
79 P.3d at 721; m, 133 ldaho at 462,988 P.2d at 688. 
Thus, this Court must first determine if the statute is plain and 
unambiguous. Only if it is not, does the Court resort to legislative history and 
rules of statutory interpretation to determine legislative intent. Finally, only if the 
statute still remains ambiguous will the Court apply the rule of lenity and resolve 
the remaining ambiguity in favor of the defendant. State v. Beard, 135 ldaho 
641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001). The statute in this case is clear. 
ldaho Code 3 18-8005(5) reads in relevant part: 
any person who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation of 
the provisions of section 18-8004(l)(a)(b) or (c), ldaho Code, who 
previously has been found guilty of or has pled guilty to two (2) or 
more violations of the provisions of section 18-8004(l)(a)(b) or (c), 
ldaho Code, or any substantially conforming foreign criminal 
violation, or any combination thereof, within ten (10) years, 
notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld 
judgment(s), shall be guilty of a felony ... 
I.C. § 18-8005(5). The plain language of the statute does not require a specific 
sequence to the acts underlying the convictions, or require that a defendant be 
convicted of each DUI in the order that they were committed. The statute only 
requires that there be two prior convictions within ten years before a felony 
sentence can be imposed for a third conviction. As stated by the district court: 
A literal reading of the statute plainly demonstrates that the word 
previous or previously refers to previous pleas of guilty or findings 
of guilt; that is, convictions previous to the third conviction. 
(R., pp. 67-68 (emphasis original).) 
In State v. Craig, 117 ldaho 983, 793 P.2d 215 (1990), the ldaho Supreme 
Court was faced with a similar question of whether a second DUI conviction 
needed to precede a third DUI violation in order for the defendant to subject to a 
felony conviction under the DUI enhancement statute. In m, the court was 
looking at a prior enactment of the DUI statute that read in pertinent part: 
Any person who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of three (3) or 
more violations of the provisions of section 18-8004, ldaho Code, 
within five (5) years, notwithstanding the form of the judgment, shall 
be guilty of a felony . . . 
m, 117 ldaho 983, 984, 793 P.2d 215, 216 (citing ldaho Code § 18- 
8005(3)(1988).) In m, the court held that a second DUI conviction does not 
have to precede a third DUI violation in order for the defendant to be subject to a 
felony conviction. The court concluded that so long as a defendant "'is found 
guilty of three (3) or more violations of the provisions of the [DUI statute] ... within 
five (5) years,' he has committed a felony, regardless of whether the third violation 
preceded the second conviction." m, 117 ldaho at 985, 793 P.2d at 217. 
Likewise, the plain language of the current enhancement statute applies to a third 
conviction in ten years, regardless of the dates of the violations. 
Nevertheless, Locke claims that the statute should be interpreted in a way 
inconsistent with this DUI being enhanced to a felony. Specifically, he argues 
that "because it is practically impossible to have two guilty DUI pleas prior to his 
second DUI offense, he could not be guilty of a felony DUI." (Appellant's brief, p. 
4.) However, Locke's proposed interpretation is contrary to the plain language of 
the statute. If the legislature intended to require that the two convictions used for 
the enhancement had to occur prior to the date of violation corresponding to the 
third conviction, it would have said so; however the legislature chose to refer only 
to the time of conviction. The plain language of the statute demands no specific 
sequence of underlying events, but only requires two prior DUI convictions within 
ten years before a felony sentence can be imposed for a third conviction. In fact, 
if the statute were interpreted as suggested by Locke, a defendant facing multiple 
DUI charges could avoid a felony conviction by quickly pleading guilty to a third- 
in-time offense and employing delaying tactics for a first- and second-in-time 
offense. This would lead to an absurd result clearly at odds with the legislative 
intent of making it a felony to have three DUI convictions within ten years. Locke 
has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
dismiss. 
Locke also compares the DUI enhancement statute to the persistent 
violator statute found at I.C. § 19-2514 and argues that the DUI statute is based 
on the idea that all such enhancements are designed to punish recidivism and 
that he should be entitled lo an opportunity to reform himself between 
convictions. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7.) This argument fails, however, for three 
reasons. First, the Court will resort to statutory construction only where 
legislative intent cannot be inferred from the plain language of the statute. State 
v. Beard, 135 ldaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001). Because, as 
argued above, the enhancement by its plain language applies when there are 
three successive convictions, resorting to the policy argument proposed by Locke 
is contrary to applicable legal standards. 
Second, it is not at all apparent that the legislature's intent was the same 
for the DUI felony enhancement statute as with the habitual offender statute. 
ldaho Code 5j 18-8005(5) only enhances DUI convictions. In contrast, I.C. § 19- 
2514 enhances any third felony conviction, for crimes ranging from murder to 
insufficient fund checks, to a potential life sentence. Locke's assumption that the 
legislature wanted to give drunk drivers an opportunity to rehabilitate after a 
conviction before enhancing the penalty for multiple DUI offenses, merely 
because it had done so for general habitual offenders, is entirely speculative. To 
the contrary, the very nature of the DUI enhancement statute indicates more 
concern with punishment and protection of society than with rehabilitation. As 
the ldaho Court of Appeals noted, "the policies behind providing enhanced 
penalties for repeat DUI offenders are to remove them from the roadways and to 
deter other potential offenders." State v. Leslie, 146 ldaho 390, 392, 195 P.3d 
749,751 (Ct. App. 2008). 
Third, application of the policy standard that Locke advocates does not 
assist him. As a general rule, under the persistent violator statute convictions 
entered the same day or charged in the same information count as a single 
violation for establishing a defendant's persistent violator status, which allows a 
defendant an opportunity to rehabilitate between convictions and assures that the 
first time offender who commits multiples felonies during the same course of 
events will be warned about the persistent violator statute. State v. Brandt, 110 
ldaho 341, 344, 715 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Ct. App. 1986); State v. Clark, 132 ldaho 
337, 339, 971 P.2d 1161, 1163 (Ct. App. 1999). However, "the nature of the 
convictions in any given situation must be examined to make certain that the 
general rule is appropriate." m, 110 ldaho at 344, 715 P.2d at 1014. Here, 
given the nature of Locke's convictions, application of the general rule would not 
be appropriate even if all three DUls had occurred on the same day. However, 
the events giving rise to the charges in all three DUI cases were not part of the 
same course of conduct. The DUls were independent charges and proceeded 
as separate cases. Further, even if he had not been previously convicted at the 
time that he committed the current offense, Locke was certainly on notice, after 
having been arrested for his first DUI, that his conduct was illegal and that the 
state would prosecute him for this type of conduct. Despite this knowledge, 
Locke nonetheless continued to drink and drive. Locke had the opportunity to 
reform his behavior and to rehabilitate himself between his first and second and 
his second and third arrest and simply failed to do so. 
A literal reading of the DUI statute plainly demonstrates that the legislature 
intended to make a third DUI conviction within ten years a felony. The use of the 
word previously refers to previous pleas of guilty or findings of guilt; that is, 
convictions previous to the third conviction. Therefore, Locke was properly found 
guilty of felony DUI pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005(5). 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Locke's judgment of 
conviction. 
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